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While the lead role in ensuring the safety of public drinking water
belongs to the EPA, Congress also intended that the states participate
in the enforcement process. The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection ("MDEP") provides that either a state
filtration determination or a failure of the water system to meet one or
more of the filtration avoidance criteria triggers the filtration
requirement.
The MDEP and the MWRA negotiated an administrative consent
order to achieve compliance with the SWTR. The final agreement
required that the MWRA prepare a watershed protection plan, and
implement other measures intended to bring the MWRA's system
within the filtration avoidance criteria. The MWRA sought to use an
ozonation method of water treatment, but agreed to comply with the
filtration requirement after a period of time. The SWTR specifies the
appropriate treatment technique by its terms. Therefore, treatment
facilities must use filtration.
The MWRA sought to use only the ozonation technique and thus
delayed the installation of a filtration method. After many years of
waiting for the MWRA to convert its systems to filtration, and because
the testing done on the MWRA's water showed that it exceeded fecal
coliform concentrations, the EPA brought this action to order the
MWRA to begin filtering its water and to impose statutory damages.
The court found that the SDWA does not deprive a court of
discretion in fashioning remedies for a violation of the SWTR.
However, it held that the MWRA is presently in violation of the
filtration avoidance criteria of the SWTR as the agency suggested, and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the appropriate form of relief to
be awarded to the United States.
Melody Divine

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 38
F.Supp.2d 802 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that in Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") initial contribution action, the applicable limitation
period is the limitation period set out in the provision foe cost recovery
action, the question of whether action can be characterized as removal
or remedial is one of law appropriate for resolution on summary
judgment, causes of action for contribution for clean up costs brought
under state law claims accrue at the same time as CERC[A
contribution claims, actions for negligence for property damage due
to hazardous waste contamination accrue when plaintiff discovers the
injury and its cause, and award of attorney fees under the California
private attorney general action provision is improper where the
primary effect of the lawsuit is to advance or vindicate plaintiffs
personal economic interest).

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

In 1982, Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD") initiated subsurface
investigations at its manufacturing facility as a result of suspicions of
leakage from underground chemical solvent storage tanks. The tests
indicated contamination principally in the ground water of the A and
B aquifers under the site. After the California Regional Water Quality
Control Board completed its investigation, AMD began studies for
installing and operating ground water extraction and treatment
systems. In 1984, AMD removed two subsurface waste solvent tanks.
In 1986, it began interim remedial measures in the A aquifer
consisting of the installation of ground water extraction wells. In
August 1987, AMD installed additional extraction wells for the B
aquifer, even though AMD was not responsible for the contamination
in that aquifer. In April 1989, an Administrative Order, No. 89-061,
adopted the cleanup site requirements for AMD, and AMD prepared
its Final Draft Remedial Investigation ("RI").
This document
determined the remedial action alternatives necessary and appropriate
for the site. In September 1991, the EPA issued its Record of Decision
("ROD") which presented the selected remedial action for the site.
AMD filed a contribution action on September 19, 1997.
CERCLA authorizes actions against responsible parties to recover
costs incurred in cleaning up hazard waste disposal sites. Section
113 (g)(2) provides the statute of limitations for cost recovery in
removal actions as three years after the completion of the removal
action. It also provides limits on cost recovery for remedial actions as
six years after initiation of physical on site construction of remedial
action. Section 113 (g)(3) provides the statute of limitations for
section 113(f) (1) contribution actions as not more than three years
after the date of judgment or the date of an administrative order.
Neither was present in this case. Thus, the question presented was
what statute of limitations to apply to initial contribution claims, to
removal action cost claims, and to remedial action cost claims.
The court held section 113(g)(2) applied to initial contribution
actions under CERCLA. Since this statute expressly provides the
statute of limitations for recovery actions, the original source of the
right to contribution under CERCLA, it follows that section 113 (g) (2)
limitations would apply.
The court then examined the limitation period for "removal
action" cost claims. Section l13(g) (2) (A) provides that an action for
recovery of costs of a removal action must be filed within three years
after completion. The parties could not agree which of AMD's actions
constituted "completion of removal action." The court also looked at
the limitation period for "remedial action" cost claims.
Section
l13(g) (2) (B) provides a six-year statute of limitations on an action to
recover costs after initiation of on-site construction of the remedial
action. The defendants contended that the ground water extraction
and treatment system installed in August of 1984 constituted
"removal." The plaintiff agreed that those actions were "removal," but
the activities were not time barred because "remedial action" began
within three years of completion of the "removal action."
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The court identified several factors that assist in the
characterization of an action as "removal" or "remedial:" (1) proximity
to disclosure of the final remedial design, which may occur prior to
approval of the final remedial plan; (2) whether Remedial
Investigation/Field Study ("RI/FS") monitoring and testing are
ongoing at the time of the action; (3) whether the action falls within
the statutory definition of "removal" (or "remedial"); and (4) the
action's role in the implementation of the permanent remedy.
Applying those factors to the AMD claim, the court first found that
final remedial designs were not disclosed until the issuance of the
September 1991 ROD. Second, site testing began in 1982, but the
testing was still being conducted in November 1987. Third, the court
found that the installation of water extraction system could constitute
"clean up of released hazardous substances" under the definition of
"remedial action." The evidence included numerous references to this
system prior to the ROD as a "remedial measure." Finally, the court
found that the installation of the well extraction system was not critical
to the implementation of the permanent remedy. That remedy was
not determined for another four years. Thus the court concluded that
AMD completed removal activity and commenced remedial action in
September 1991. Since the actions were therefore within three years
of each other, the action for contribution for costs were timely under
section 113(g) (2) (B).
The court did not grant AMD's claim for contribution under
California State Law. The court held that claims under California
Health & Safety Code accrue at the same time as a CERCLA
contribution claim. Thus the action accrued in September 1991. The
California Civil Code applies a three-year statute of limitations to
claims under the California Health & Safety Code. Therefore, the
claim, filed in September 1997, was untimely. Similarly, the court
found that the statute of limitations barred AMD's claim for
negligence and negligence per se. The court stated that a cause of
action arising from alleged property damage due to hazardous waste
contamination accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury and its
cause, or should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The court held that AMD should have discovered this injury by at least
September 1991. Thus a negligence claim, filed six years later, is time
barred. The court also denied attorney fees, which a court may award
to a successful party in a "private attorney general" action to enforce
an important right affecting the public interest. The court held that
the primary effect of the lawsuit was to advance or vindicate the
plaintiffs personal economic interests, not to affect a public interest.
Thus the award of attorney fees is improper under this statute. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of AMD in regard to the
contribution claims and denied summary judgment on the remaining
claims.
Kimberley Crawford

